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Abstract of the paper: The purpose of this paper is to analyze the implication of 
wetland construction for the cost-effective design of a pesticide charge. A model is 
developed in order to show that, for a given target, the introduction of wetland 
construction can reduce overall abatement costs and can lower the input charge 
asked to the farmers. This result remains true as long as the cost of constructing a 
wetland is not too high. A numerical illustration is carried out in order to simulate 
pesticide regulations in a wine catchment in North-East of France. 
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In the European Union, the water policy is mainly driven by the Water Framework Directive
(WFD) of 2000. One of its main targets is to work toward an environmental quality illustrating
the best trade-oﬀ between economic and ecological interests. One consequence is that member
states are looking for economic instruments allowing to reach a pre-deﬁned standard of water
pollution at the lowest cost possible. Wetlands play a crucial and growing role since they
can constitute one of the cheapest means to be used, in combination with classic regulation
instruments like charges on polluting inputs, in order to achieve environmental quality standards.
For instance, in Sweden, one of the measures implemented by the Government in order to
reduce the excessive nutrients that contribute to the eutrophication of the Baltic Sea was the
establishment and restoration of wetlands.1
The point of departure of our paper is that the lowest cost possible means of improving
water quality could involve the use of wetlands. But what are the implications in terms of water
pollution regulation? The WFD also promotes the extensive use of economic incentives like
input charges. This means that governments have to combine economic instruments consisting
in giving incentives to reduce the use of polluting inputs and wetlands restoration. What will
be the eﬀect of using wetlands on the input charge and on the farmers’ abatement eﬀort? This
is the main question that we want to investigate in this work. In order to answer, we propose to
build a model underlying the main forces that are at work. We will keep this model as simple
as possible in order to be able to illustrate it by using some "real" data.
Söderqvist (2002) explained that "wetlands can reduce nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorus)
in water by denitriﬁcation, sedimentation, and plant uptake, although nutrient reduction seems
to vary substantially among diﬀerent types of wetlands and climatic conditions".T a k i n gt h ef a c t
that wetlands have a signiﬁcant capacity to reduce pollution as a point of departure, Byström
(2000) estimated a replacement value for wetlands in Sweden in order to assess how eﬀective
wetlands are, relative to other abatement measures, in providing low cost reductions of nitrogen
pollution. In order to do so, he deﬁned such a value as the savings in total abatement costs
that are made possible by using wetlands as an abatement measure. He noted that he does not
consider other values of wetlands such as recreational ones or ﬂood control.2 In his work, Byström
(2000) was looking for the cost-eﬀective reductions of nitrogen load to the Baltic Sea among
nutrients application reduction, land usage change and restoration of wetlands. More recently,
Herberling, Garcia and Thurston (2010) proposed to study the possibility of incorporating the
1See Gren, Elofsson and Jannke (1997), for instance.
2The reader is referred to Brander et al. (2006) for a complete survey related to economic valuation of wetlands.
1use of wetlands in water quality trading programs in order to meet national wetlands goals and
advance these programs. The main contribution of our work with respect to this literature is to
study the implication of wetlands for the cost-eﬀective design of an input charge. In the case
of nitrate pollution this consideration is of wide interest since several European countries such
as Finland, Austria, Sweden, Denmark or the Netherlands implemented charges. But Bel et
al. (2004) showed that the tax on fertilizers had almost no impact on fertilizers sales, mainly
because of their rate being too low. In our framework, the charge will be assumed to be at the
"good" incentive rate.
A wide range of the most recent literature related to the question of wetlands ability of
reducing water pollution deals with uncertainty aspects. For instance, Paulsen (2007) discussed
how uncertainty inﬂuences a farmer’s decision-making process and how diﬀerent information
structures might aﬀect the private decision to change land usage from agricultural, or an other
usage, into wetlands. She took one of Byström’s paper (2000) implications, according to which
a subsidy established for wetland construction does not have the same eﬀect in southern Sweden
as in other regions of the country, as a point of departure in order to analyze how uncertainty
can explain these diﬀerences. Crépin (2005) studied the incentives (in the form of contracts)
for wetlands creation in an asymmetrical information context. All these works are primarily
concerned with the wetlands restoration by agents (farmers) themselves. Our main message is
quite diﬀerent since it relies on the fact that the regulation of water pollution should not be
considered independently of other regulations such as the size of wetland restored by a regulator
(and not an agent). It is why we will rather focus on a deterministic setting with perfect and
complete information of the regulator. In a setting where the regulator can set the level of
the input charge knowing the reaction of the polluter, the potential of wetlands for cleaning
water in a cost-eﬀective framework must be the worst one and if this potential is conﬁrmed, it
will also be the case in an incomplete information setting. Besides, Byström, Andersson and
Gren (2000) already addressed the questions of the uncertainty of wetland’s abatement capacity
and of the impact on the overall uncertainty of pollution. They showed that wetlands remain
economically rational to use. Furthermore, in order to lead a complete numerical illustration in
an uncertain setting, we would need more data from scientists of other disciplines. It is why we
decided to leave the question of the uncertainty of the wetland abatement capacity to a future
multidisciplinary work.
All the papers previously quoted are primarily concerned with denitriﬁcation and natural
wetlands. In the chemistry literature, Grégoire et al. (2009) explained that "among the com-
munications devoted to artiﬁcial wetlands since 1973—2007 (i.e., 32%), 39% reported on the
fate of the nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorus) in the hydrosystem, 11% dealt with the fate of
2the heavy metals, 8% are devoted to the study of dairy at the farmer scale and only 2% dealt
with the pesticides fate in the environment. Since the last 7 years (i.e., 2000), the proportion
of the publications concerning pesticides fate in the artiﬁcial wetlands increased (Schulz 2004)
and reached 8% of the publications devoted to the artiﬁcial wetlands and natural wetlands." Our
numerical illustration is based on pesticide pollution of water and on its assimilation by an Ar-
tiﬁcial Wetland (AW). We deﬁne an AW as a wetland constructed on purpose by a regulator,
with an impermeable bottom.
European policy concerned with pesticides begun in 1979, then evolved until the Council
Directive 91/414/EEC, which framed the evaluation, the marketing and the use of pesticides
(herbicides, insecticides, fungicides etc.) in plant protection in the Community. However con-
sumption and use of pesticides have not decreased in the European Union. Thus the Thematic
Strategy on the sustainable use of pesticides was adopted in 2006. This Strategy leads to the
Directive 2009/128/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 es-
tablishing a framework for Community action to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides. This
Directive encourages the use of economic instruments: "Economic instruments can play a cru-
cial role in the achievement of objectives relating to the sustainable use of pesticides. The use
of such instruments at the appropriate level should therefore be encouraged while stressing that
individual Member States can decide on their use without prejudice to the applicability of the
State aid rules". It is why we will take the use of an economic instrument such as an input
charge as a point of departure and we will study how this instrument is likely to depend on
wether an AW is constructed or not. This is consistent with our assumption according to which
the regulator perfectly knows the cost functions of the farmers: in such an ideal context, the
input charge is one of the best economic instrument to be used. The rate applied in real case
studies is too low to be eﬃcient. We will rather reason on an eﬃcient rate.
To sum up, our main aim is to analyze the implication of considering AW construction as
a new regulation tool on the cost-eﬀective design of a pesticide charge. In order to do so, we
constructed a model easily tractable for a numerical illustration with some "real" data relating
to AW capacity of pesticides abatement, issued from scientists of other disciplines.
An AW acts as a natural ﬁlter. Both bacteria and plants having colonized the AW participate
to the pollution assimilation. The amount of pollution assimilated depends on how long (in
hours) the water lie in the AW; this duration is strongly linked to the size of the AW. In
a static3 framework, the eﬃciency of an AW thus depends both on the mass of pesticides into
water when it enters into the AW and on the size of the AW. It is exactly the same running as for
3A dynamic setting with a time step of hours does not make sense in economics.
3a natural wetland (see for instance Byström, 2000). The diﬀerence in our framework is that we
assumed that the farmers are not able to construct an AW in order to reduce pollution because
of the opportunity cost of land being too high. We made this assumption because we wanted to
underline the fact that water pollution regulation can no more be considered independently of
other regulations such as AW construction. As a consequence, in our framework, the regulator
is either able to increase or decrease the size of the AW.
We considered a regulator who controls the w a t e rp o l l u t i o ni nt h ew a yr e c o m m e n d e db y
the WFD: a target mass of pesticides has to be attained at the lowest cost possible, within
the framework of the "polluter pays" principle.4 This means that the farmers have to bear
the costs of reducing pollution toward the target mass5 and that the regulator is not a proﬁts
maximizer. In order to investigate how the consideration of the construction of an AW can
aﬀect the pesticide charge used in order to regulate water pollution, we decided to compare two
versions of the model: the version in which the regulator additionally constructs an AW in order
to reduce pollution and the other one in which it does not. We showed that the consideration of
AW construction possibility can reduce the proportional charge on pesticides used that has to
be implemented and thus the eﬀort that is made by the farmers in terms of input used reduction
made in order to reach the target mass of pesticides in water. This result is illustrated with
a case of fungicides pollution by wine-growers. Its validity domain strongly depends on the
relationship between the cost of constructing the AW and the reduction of eﬀort implied for the
farmers.
We will present our model in section 2. In section 3, we will study the benchmark case
in which the regulator does not construct an AW in order to reduce pollution. Section 4 will
be devoted to the case in which it is constructed. In section 5, we will compare the two cases
in order to investigate the implications on the charge that has to be implemented within such
a framework, and thus on the eﬀort of pollution abatement made by the farmer. Finally, in
section 6, we will develop a numerical illustration applied to a wine catchment area located in
North-East of France. We will conclude this work in section 7.
4For the purpose of the numerical illustration, in this work, we will concentrate on a mass of pesticides although
the WFD is more concerned with a concentration. But if we exclude the questions of hydraulic diﬀerences, it is
very easy to turn to a concentration since it is the ratio of this mass with the volume of water concerned.
5Within such a framework, the target mass of pesticides can be socially optimal although the agency does not
have the information about the marginal damage of this pollution. For instance, in Europe, the Good Status of
the WFD has been deﬁned during a bargaining process between environmental protection associations, polluters
and water users.
42 The model
We consider a watershed with a ﬁxed number  of farmers and a regulator. The regulator wants
to reduce pollution from pesticides used by farmers in order to reach a water quality target in
the outlet of the watershed. We assume that there are two possible ways of reducing pollution:
• on the one hand, the farmers are supposed to be able to reduce the amount of pesticides
used if the regulator gives them some economic incentives,
• on the other hand, the regulator can construct an AW that is able to remove pesticides
molecules from water.
In order to keep the model easily tractable for a numerical illustration, the farmers are
assumed symmetrical.  denotes the amount of pesticides used by a farmer.  := ¯  −  is
the pesticide used reduction operated by the farmer with respect to the one corresponding to
his optimal running, . The pesticides used reduction  has a cost6, (),w h i c hr e ﬂects the
change in the farmer’s proﬁts resulting from this reduction. This cost is assumed to increase
with the amount of pesticides removed, at an increasing rate (it is convex):   0 and   0.7
Furthermore, no reduction induces no cost, (0) = 0; small reductions are not very costly,
lim
→0
 =0 ; but large ones are disheartening, lim
→−
 =+ ∞.  → 0 means that the amount of
pesticides used is at its maximum, ,a n d →  −  that it is at its minimum one, .
We also assume that the mass of pesticides in water, , is proportional to the total amount
of pesticides used:  :=  where  :=  is the global amount of pesticides used at the
catchment level and  ∈ [01] is the transfer coeﬃcient of the pesticides used into the water;
1 −  is usually called the natural assimilative capacity.
The regulator is assumed to own the land located downstream with respect to the farmers’
ﬁelds. As a consequence, it can decide to construct on these lands an AW of size , in order to
eliminate some pesticides contained in water at the outlet of the watershed under consideration.
We assume that the suitable land area that can be converted into an AW is such that the size
can not be higher than , since the regulator does not hold inﬁnite property rights on lands.
The construction of an AW has a cost that is assumed to depend on the size converted: ().
It is increasing,   0, and convex,   0, and there is no cost when no AW is constructed:
6In order to keep the model easily tractable for a numerical illustration (no game theory framework with
heterogeneous agents), this cost function is assumed to be the same one for all farmers.
7Subscripts of functions indicate partial derivatives.
5(0) = 0. Furthermore, small constructions are not very costly, lim
→0




Concerning the physical process behind the reduction of the pollution with pesticides thanks
to the construction of the AW, we are going to assume that the quantity, , of pesticides as-
s i m i l a t e db ya nA Wo fs i z e, depends both on the total mass of pesticides in water at the
exit of the AW, , and on this size:  := ().W e e x p e c t t h a t  is increasing with the
size of the AW (at a decreasing rate:   0) and also with the mass of pesticides ( and
  0).  can be interpreted as the eﬃciency of a pre-determined AW with respect to the
pesticides assimilation; it is positive and we assume that the mass of pesticides assimilated by
the AW increases less than one unit when the mass of pesticides entering into it increases in
one unit: 1    0. No molecule of pesticides induces no assimilation and neither does no
AW construction: (0)=(0) = 0. The total size of AW available, ¯ , is assumed so high
that, next to this point, each additional unit of AW becomes ineﬃcient, lim
→
 =0∀0,
a n dw h e nn oA Wi sc o n s t r u c t e d ,t h ee ﬃciency of constructing the ﬁrst unit is assumed strictly
positive, lim
→0
  0 ∀0.8
To sum up,
• when the AW is not constructed, the mass of pesticide in water is proportional to the
quantity applied by the farmers: ,
• and when it is constructed, the mass of pesticide in water is equal to the previous one
minus the assimilation of pesticides by the AW:  − ().
The target mass of pesticides is denoted . The pollution induced by the minimum mass
of pesticides used is assumed always lower than the target mass:    where  :=
. Furthermore, the AW is assumed to be unable to assimilate the amount of pesticides
corresponding to the farmers’ maximum proﬁts up to the target mass:  − ()  
∀0 where  := . As a consequence, the pollution induced by the maximum mass of
pesticides used is always higher than the target mass: .9 This assumption, combined
with the symmetrical one, is in phase with the WFD setting since the target mass, ,i s
negotiated between farmers and environmental protection associations. The assumption on the
target mass without AW construction also implies that:  − ()   ∀.
8All these assumptions were approved by some soil experts, members of the LIFE Environment ARTWET
project.
9This assumption doesn’t work for pesticides with very low adverse eﬀects in aquatic ecosystems where the
pollution corresponding to farmers’ maximum proﬁt could be below the targeted mass. A a consequence, our
results won’t ﬁt to such uncommon kind of pesticides.
6Remark 1 Our assumptions on () insures that the minimum of this function is reached at
 = .
Remark 1 tells us that when no regulation is implemented, the farmers aiming at minimizing
the costs of their pesticides used reduction will choose to use the amount of pesticides maximizing
their proﬁts. Since we assumed that , the target mass can not be reached without some
form of regulation of water pollution like a charge on pesticides used. Within our framework, it is
the regulator that will pursue this aim. In the benchmark case, this regulator will only implement
such a ﬁscal scheme. We will then consider another case in which an AW can be constructed in
order to reduce the mass of pesticides in water. In this latter case, since we assumed that the
t o t a lA Ws i z ec a nn o tb es u ﬃcient in order to reach the target ( −()   ∀0),
the regulator will also have to implement a new ﬁscal scheme. We make these assumptions in
order to concentrate on the impact of an AW construction on the proportional ﬁscal scheme in
more details. From the best of our knowledge, no paper concentrates on this aspect.
3 The benchmark case: the artiﬁcial wetland is not constructed
In order to better underline the implications of AW construction, we propose to build a very
basic model consisting in three steps. But since these steps reﬂect a decision process, they can
be considered so closed in time that it is possible to ignore discounting eﬀects.
• In the ﬁrst step, the regulator chooses the proportional charge on pesticides use, ,10 that
minimizes the sum of the farmers’ costs needed in order to achieve the target mass.
• In the second step, each farmer chooses the amount of pesticides that minimizes his costs,
which then include the level of money levied through this proportional charge. In this
work, we don’t enter into the description of the decision process behind the pesticides
used reduction.
• In the third step, the regulator balances its budget through transferring the amount of
money collected in the previous step as a lump-sum transfer back to the farmers who are
assumed myopic, i.e. they do not anticipate the exact value of this lump-sum transfer. We
justify the requirement of a balanced budget with respect to charge/lump sum payments
for water pollution by a "water pays water" principle. Furthermore, this will allow us to
lead a complete cost-eﬀectiveness analysis.
10It is the same one for each farmer since they are assumed symmetrical.
7We are going to solve this model backward.
In the third step and once the target mass had been reached, the total amount of money
collected with the charge on pesticides used is redistributed, in an equal way, as a lump-sum
transfer, f  = 
 , to each farmer. The regulator is assumed to be a public agency that does
n o tw a n tt om a k ep r o ﬁts; it is why it redistributes the money collected to the agents that we
have in our model: the farmers. We assume all along this paper that there are no regulation
costs.
The lump-sum transfer could induce a strategic behavior of the farmers consisting in not
reducing the amount of pesticides used. But we assumed that they are myopic and thus unable
to anticipate the amount of the transfer, i.e. the lump-sum appears as a constant in the objective
function of the polluter. What about the European "polluter pays" principle? It is still at work
since even if the charge collected in order to reduce pesticides used is given back to the farmer,
he has to incur the costs of reducing his pesticides use up to the level allowing to reach the
target .
In the second step, each farmer takes the charge rate as given since it is ﬁxed by the
regulator. Furthermore, since the farmers are assumed myopic, they are unable to anticipate
the exact value of the lump-sum transfer. The program that each farmer solves is thus the basic
following one:
min
 (()) + − f 
where ()= − .
Remark 2 The objective function is strictly convex since (− + ) =   0.
The solution ∗ of this program, where the superscript ∗ denotes the solution of the bench-
mark case, satisﬁes a classic ﬁrst order condition according to which marginal cost of abatement
equalizes the charge on pesticides:
∗
 =  (1)
Lemma 1 (i) The total amount of pesticides used in the catchment area exists and decreases
with the charge rate.
(ii) When the charge rate is zero, the amount of pesticides used in the catchment area is maximum
and when the charge is very high, it goes to its minimum.
It directly follows from this lemma that ∗() ∈ [].
8Finally, in the ﬁrst step, the regulator chooses the proportional ﬁscal scheme  such that
the target mass is reached:
∗()=
We assumed that it has got a perfect and complete information but no proﬁts maximization
objective. As a consequence, it is perfectly able to anticipate the best reply of the farmers to
this charge, ∗().
Furthermore, our assumptions on the target mass,   , insure that ∗() ∈
][ and the interiority of the charge rate, i.e. ∗ ∈]0+∞[, then directly comes from Lemma
1.




 denotes the marginal cost of removing one unit of pesticide from water.
(ii) The global amount of pesticides used in the catchment area is decreasing with the transfer
coeﬃcient of pesticides into water and increasing with the target mass.
(iii) The cost-eﬀective charge on pesticides is increasing with the transfer coeﬃcient and
decreasing with the target mass.
We now turn to the study of the solution of the same problem in which we add the AW
construction.
4 The new condition of cost-eﬀectiveness when an artiﬁcial wet-
land is constructed
As we explained in the introduction, there is some empirical evidence in favour of the construc-
tion of AW in order to clean up water from the pesticides that it contains. When the regulator
is taken this possibility into account, it is mainly the ﬁrst and the third steps of the model
previously studied that are changed. As before, the model is going to be solved backward.
In the third step, as in the previous case, a lump-sum transfer is redistributed to the farmers.
It now includes the AW construction costs and becomes the following one: c  =
−()
 .W i t h
such a formulation, the AW construction costs are incured by the farmers; the "polluter pays"
principle is thus checked and, contrary to the benchmark case, the lump-sum transfer can either
be positive or negative, according to the size of the AW.
In the second step, the objective function of each farmer is the same one as when the
regulator does not construct an AW except that the lump-sum transfer has got a quite diﬀerent
9value. But this has no eﬀect on the marginal values and the solution shares the same properties
as in the case where the AW is not constructed.
In the ﬁrst step, the regulator chooses the proportional charge on pesticides, ,t h a tm i n i -
mizes the costs needed in order to achieve the target mass, i.e. the sum of the costs of reducing
the amount of pesticides used and of AW construction. We remind here that we assumed that
AW construction can only be implemented by the regulator. The optimization program to be
solved by the regulator is thus the following one:
min

( − ~()) + ()





where ~() shares the same properties as ∗() and the superscript ~ denotes the solution
of the model with AW construction.
Proposition 2 When the regulator considers the possibility of constructing an AW in order to
reduce the mass of pesticides in water, the unique solution of the model,
¡
~~ ~~¢
,e x i s t s
and is such that the marginal cost of removing one unit of pesticide from water located after the
AW is the same one if an AW is constructed and if the pesticides uses are reduced, i.e. they are













We now want to investigate the implications of the regulator construction of AW in order to
clean up the water pollution with pesticides.
5 The implications of constructing an artiﬁcial wetland
We are going to compare the results obtained in both the versions of our model (denoted by the
superscripts ∗ and ~).
First of all, if the target mass is reached in both cases, the eﬀort made by the farmer in order
to do so is quite diﬀerent. Indeed, since we showed that ~ ∈][ and ~ ∈]0 ¯ [,w ek n o w
from our assumptions that ~  0. It directly follows that the amount of pesticides used by the
farmers in the benchmark case is lower than the one occurring when the regulator constructs an
AW, both at an individual and at an aggregate level:
~  ∗ ⇔ ~  ∗
As a consequence, AW construction reduces the aggregate, ∆ := , and the individual eﬀort,
10, that is made by the farmers of the catchment in terms of pesticides used reduction in order
to reach the target mass:
∆∗  ∆~ ⇔ ∗  ~
What about the cost-eﬀectiveness of reaching the target mass thanks to AW construction
if some interiority assumptions (ensuring that  6=0 ) are relaxed? Up to this point, it seems
that the construction of an AW by the regulator generates a gain, Γ := (∗)−
¡
~¢
,w h i c h
accrues to the farmers since the use of a higher amount of pesticides reduces the cost, ,o ft h e
deviation from the point maximizing their proﬁts, :
  0 and ∗   ~ ⇒ (∗)  
¡
~¢
and Γ  0
B u ti no r d e rt of u l l yc o m p a r et h ec o s t - e ﬀectiveness of the two cases, we also have to enter
into the picture the global ﬁscal scheme (the proportional charge, , but also the lump-sum
transfer, ) implemented by the regulator. As a consequence, we compare the global cost




+(~) for the case with AW since the ﬁscal schemes are respectively (∗ f )
and (~ c ). According to the diﬀerence between the gains accruing to the farmers thanks to
an AW construction and the costs induced, we can distinguish between two cases:
(i) if Γ  (~), constructing an AW in addition to a ﬁscal scheme is more cost-eﬀective
than not,
(ii) if Γ  (~), constructing an AW is not cost-eﬀective.
Finally, we can simply deduce from   0 and (∗) 
¡
~¢
a property of the charge
levied on each unit of pesticides used according to which it is higher in the benchmark case than
in the case with AW construction:
∗  ~
Proposition 3 The proportional charge that has to be implemented in order to reduce pollution
with pesticides to the target mass is lower than if no AW had been constructed: ∗  ~.W h e n
the AW is constructed, the total eﬀort that is made by the farmers in order to reach the target
mass in water is reduced: ∆∗  ∆~.
This result can seem quite uncommon since when AW are constructed, the farmer is allowed
to pollute more, i.e. this type of water pollution regulation increases the amount of pesticides
used allowed. But the reader must keep in mind that the target mass is still reached. Further-
m o r e ,i fw en o wi m a g i n et h a tn oﬁscal scheme is implemented, we know from our assumptions
11that the farmer will use the maximum amount of pesticides, , and that the target mass won’t
be reached, neither in the case without AW, nor in the one with it. Nevertheless it remains that
AW allows to reduce the ambient amount of pesticides contained in water since we have:





As a consequence, our results abet the possibility of more stringent water quality when AW can
be constructed by the regulator.
6 A numerical illustration: a wine catchment area in Rouﬀach
(North-East of France)
To illustrate the theoretical model, we further propose a numerical illustration. For this illustra-
tion, we focus on fungicide pollution from viticulture. For the ease of exposition we propose to
name the assimilation of pesticides by the AW the "downstream treatment" and the abatement
by the farmers the "upstream treatment".
6.1 Downstream treatment
In the framework of the LIFE Environment ARTWET project, Grégoire (Grégoire et al., 2009)
and Imfeld (Imfeld et al., 2009) completed some experiments in a small catchment in Alsace
(France) to simulate the credibility of an AW for removing pesticides from water.
In this catchment of 289 ,a b o u t20  of fungicides are applied upstream by 28 wine-
growers each year, and each year about 20  streams to the AW after rain events. The residues
are assimilated or stocked upstream, and a part can be found on the groundwater in the long
term. In this illustration we are only interested in the short term eﬀect namely the fungicides
that reach the AW.
In the theoretical model the treatment rises when the size  of the AW increases. Here, this
eﬀect is reproduced by increasing the size of the gravel ﬁlter. Increasing the gravel ﬁlter causes
an increase of the hydraulic retention time and, therefore the removal of pesticides. Nevertheless,
above a certain threshold, increasing the gravel ﬁlter more is useless.
From the observation of 12 rain events from April 2009 to July 2009, we have estimated the
treatment function  according to the volume of the ﬁlter  and the mass of pesticides  as
following (see appendix E for more details):




12The functional form selected ﬁt to the main assumptions of the theoretical model since:  =
10−4 (−09 + 126) and  =1 0 −4 ¡
−0452 + 126
¢
. In appendix E, we also explain how
we have calibrated the natural assimilative capacity (without AW) as  =6 10−3.
The gravel ﬁlter consists in quaternary gravels from the local Alsatian quaternary ﬂoodplain
and a gabion barrier in front of the ﬁlter to block the gravel mass. We used data provided by
the LIFE Environment ARTWET project: the gabion barrier has a unit cost of 5000  and the
price of the gravel is about 15  per 3:11
()=1 5  + 5000
6.2 Upstream treatment
Leroy and Soler, within the Framework of a French project (see Bazoche et al., 2009), estimated
the reduction of the mean yield when the wine-growers use less fungicides. In calibrating this
information with economic data of this catchment, we estimated the following function (see
appendix F for more details):
()=0 02242 +2 
with:  =0 0224 +2 .
The abatement cost is estimated as an opportunity cost (proﬁt loss) when the fungicides
used decreases. In such a case, a part of the production is lost, because ofd i s e a s e si n c r e a s e .
6.3 Results of the simulations
First, the reader certainly noticed that all our theoretical assumptions are not exactly checked,
specially the one ensuring the uniqueness of the solution. In the simulations, we obtained a
unique solution by not considering solutions with a complex part.
Without any regulation, the maximum quantity of fungicides spread upstream, ¯ ,i se q u a l
to 24620 g.
One per 1000 reaches the AW zone, which treats again 40% of pesticides when there is no
AW ( =0 ). Then with  =2 4 620 and  =0 ,i tr e m a i n s14769 mg of fungicides in the
downstream of the AW.
If we want to divide this mass of pesticides by 10 without increasing ,w eh a v et or e d u c e
 from 24620 gt o2462 g. The total abatement cost is then 436929  and the charge rate
is 374  by gram.
11Let us remind that we assumed that the regulator already owns lands bordering some farmers’ ﬁelds.
13Nevertheless another solution would consist in a combination of upstream and downstream
eﬀort. By this way, we can reach the same target of 14769 mg with a total cost of 25885
 by increasing  to 13988 (downstream cost ()=7 098 ) and reducing  to 20860 g
(upstream cost (∆)=1 8 786 ) .T h ec h a r g er a t ef o rt h ef a r m e r si s8  by gram of fungicides
rejected and the diﬀerence between the charge paid and the cost of the AW construction, ,
is 159937 .
Then, with the AW the percentage reduction of the total cost is 94%, and the reduction of
t h ec h a r g er a t ei sa b o u t785%.
A sensibility study around this target, gave us the following Figure 1 (see the detailed results
with and without AW in Appendix G).








Figure 1: Savings with AW construction
We can see on Figure 1 that the savings with the AW are very important. The magnitude
of these savings seems to depend on the target.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we proposed to consider an original method of abatement of water pollution with
pesticides: AW construction. The assimilative capacity of an AW diﬀers here from the basic
n a t u r a lo n eb yt h ef a c tt h a ti ts t r o n g l yd e p e n d so nt h es i z eo ft h eﬁlter that can be adjusted
by the regulator with a limited amount of land. The main diﬀerence of our paper with respect
to the existing literature is that we studied the impact of considering AW construction on the
ﬁscal scheme implemented by a regulator in order to reduce water pollution with pesticides to
14a target mass. We also studied its impact on the eﬀort that is made by a farmer in order to
reduce pesticides found in water bodies.
More particularly, we showed that the consideration of AW construction in order to reach
a pre-determined target mass of pesticides in water can reduce both the eﬀo r tt h a ti sm a d e
by the farmers and the charge on pesticides that has to be implemented. We checked this
theoretical result on a numerical example. It remains true as long as the costs of constructing
an AW are lower than the gains accruing to the farmers thanks to the AW construction. As a
consequence, our framework is able to take into account the trade-oﬀs that can occur between
diﬀerent land-usages.
Policy implications are of two natures. Firstly, our results abets the possibility for more
stringent water quality standards at the national level since regulators can construct AW in
order to reduce the amount of pesticides contained in water. Secondly, we know that in the
real life input charges are below their optimal level for lobbying reasons. When considering the
possibility of constructing an AW in addition to classic regulation tools such as environmental
taxation, our results show that the input charges implemented in practice by policy-makers
could come closer to the optimal input charges needed in such a situation.
Our model is so generic that it could be applied to any measure with a similar assimilative
capacity and cost function. And as a consequence such a measure would result in the same
conclusion with regards to eﬃciency of the input charge under its presence.
Nevertheless, this work contains some limits. Firstly, we need to investigate empirically the
costs functions in order to lead a more robust empirical analysis and, in the line of Shibata
and Winrich (1983), to see how results could be changed according to the assumptions made
on this function. But in order to carry out a careful econometric analysis, we need more data
related to the wine-growers production function and to the AW costs. Secondly, we did not enter
into the picture the fact that AW can provide a lot of other services, in particular ecological
one. Considering them induces that AW construction can even more be of major importance,
assuming that these services are higher than the one induced by an input charge that would
also have to be taken into account within such a framework. Indeed, the beneﬁts induced
by an input charge must include the eﬀect on health of pesticide used reduction in agricultural
production. But in the real world, the ecological services of wetlands and the eﬀects of pesticides
used reduction on health are very diﬃcult to evaluate and, from the best of our knowledge, no
economic work concentrates on the AW services. It is why we limited our work to a cost-eﬀective
framework. Finally, it would be of interest to include some dynamic eﬀects in the assimilation
process of the AW. But such an extension needs a strong help from scientists of other disciplines
and it is why it is left for future works.
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17APPENDIX
AP r o o f o f L e m m a 1
(i) From equation 1, we deﬁne the following function:
Ψ(): =− ( − )+
We deduce from our assumptions lim
→
 =0and lim
→ =+ ∞ that lim
→¯ Ψ  0 and lim
→Ψ  0 ∀0.

















(ii) If we put our assumptions lim
→
 =0and lim






∗ ()=. Finally, we have: lim
→0

∗ ()=¯  = ¯  = lim
→0

∗ () and lim
→+∞





B Proof of proposition 1
(i) Even if the proof of this proposition is direct and in order to clarify the section with AW, we propose here to
deﬁne the solution of the problem characterizing the benchmark case as the one of an optimization program in
which the regulator looks for the optimal charge minimizing the total costs incured by the farmers in order to
reach the target mass . Since we assumed that the information of the regulator is perfect and complete, it
is able to anticipate the best-response of each farmer to the charge: 
∗(). Furthermore, the lump-sum transfer
and the proportional charge compensate themselves in such a way that the optimization program to be solved is


























∗ is a solution of the regulator problem then there exists a unique 









∗ −  =0 (3)









∗) is a global minimum.
Our assumptions on the target mass,  , insure that 
∗() ∈][ and the interiority of the
charge rate, i.e. 
∗ ∈]+∞0[, then directly comes from (ii) of lemma 1. It follows that 
∗  0.







































C Proof of proposition 2















The constraint qualiﬁcation is checked since we know from the (i) of lemma 1, and the assumptions 1    0,




























~) is a solution of the regulator problem then there exists a unique 
~ such that the following ﬁrst


























−  =0 (6)












~ (1 − )

−
−  − 
~

We deduce from the evaluation of this matrix at the optimum that the minimum deﬁned by the previous ﬁrst












Our assumptions on the target mass, − ()     ∀, insure that 
~() ∈][ and the
interiority of the charge rate, i.e. 
~ ∈]+∞0[, then directly comes from (ii) of Lemma 1. It follows that

~  0. Putting now the assumptions lim
→0
  0 ∀0 and lim
→0





 =+ ∞ in the ﬁrst order equation related to  we have that  ∈]0 ¯ [.
It then directly follows that:




















D Proof of proposition 3
T h ee l e m e n t so ft h ep r o o fa r eg i v e ni nt h et e x t .
E Calibration of the pesticides assimilative capacity of the AW
At the entrance to the public land (where the AW is constructed), it remains only 11000 of the quantity  of
fungicides rejected upstream. Without AW construction ( =0 ), the soil could treat another 40% of fungicides.
Then we have:  =6 10000.
On average, we know from soils experts involved in the LIFE Environment ARTWET project previously
quoted that the Rouﬀach AW treatment increases from 40% to 80% with  =6 7 2 
3,a n dt o90% with  = 1344

3
Then, by extrapolation, we look for a function that crosses these points, and with a derivative equal to zero
for ¯  = 140 












2 +1 2 6 


since  := .
F Calibration of the pollution abatement cost
The following Figure 2 is obtained thanks to the Leroy and Soler results (Bazoche et al., 2009).





Figure 2: Yields according to the number of fungicides applications
20In the studied catchment, about 20  of fungicides are spread upstream each year by the 28 wine-growers
who are assumed identical. As a consequence, 0714  of fungicides are spread by each wine-grower The vineyard
average yield was 95% in 2008
12,w h i c hc o r r e s p o n d s ,o na v e r a g e ,t o65 applications of fungicides. So we suppose
that the whole wine-growers use 3077  of fungicides by application.
In the Upper-Rhine French administrative department, the viticulture sales are, on average, 293000000 
on 9000 
13. Then, we estimate that in the 289  (namely a little more than 1  per wine-grower) of our
studied catchment, the sales are 940856  (namely 33602  per wine-grower).
Therefore, we estimate that a yield equal to 95% corresponds to sales equal to 940856 .T o ﬁnd the
wine-grower proﬁt, we deduct the costs from the sales. First, the fungicides costs are estimated at 1334  by
application in the whole catchment (namely 476  per wine-grower). The other costs represent, on average, 56%
of the sales: 85% are ﬁxed and 15% are proportional to the yield.
We consider that the total upstream treatment cost is the diﬀerence between the proﬁt with a maximum yield
(obtained with a maximal quantity of fungicides: 24615  namely 879  per wine-grower), and the proﬁtw i t h
the quantity of fungicides actually used.
Figure 3 sums up the simulations run on these basis.
  Yield Number of applications Fungicides quantity Sales Fungicides costs Other costs Profit Treatment Upstream treatment cost
38% 0 0 370,931 0 479,005 -108,075 24,615 539,754
45% 0.5 1,538 439,907 667 484,799 -45,559 23,077 477,238
51% 1 3,077 504,694 1 ,334 490,242 13,119 21,538 418,560
57% 1.5 4,615 565,292 2 ,001 495,332 67,959 20,000 363,720
63% 2 6,154 621,701 2 ,668 500,070 118,962 18,462 312,717
68% 2.5 7,692 673,920 3 ,335 504,456 166,128 16,923 265,551
73% 3 9,231 721,949 4 ,002 508,491 209,456 15,385 222,223
78% 3.5 10,769 765,790 4,669 512,174 248,947 13,846 182,732
82% 4 12,308 805,441 5,336 515,504 284,600 12,308 147,079
85% 4.5 13,846 840,902 6,003 518,483 316,416 10,769 115,263
88% 5 15,385 872,175 6,670 521,110 344,395 9,231 87,284
91% 5.5 16,923 899,258 7,337 523,385 368,536 7,692 63,143
94% 6 18,462 922,151 8,004 525,308 388,839 6,154 42,840
95% 6.5 20,000 940,856 8,671 526,879 405,305 4,615 26,374
97% 7 21,538 955,370 9,338 528,098 417,934 3,077 13,745
98% 7.5 23,077 965,696 10,005 528,966 426,725 1,538 4,954
99% 8 24,615 971,832 10,672 529,481 431,679 00
Figure 3: Upstream data for the whole catchment
In accordance with the Figure 4, we choose the function:
(∆)=0 0008∆
2 +2 ∆








2 +2( 2 8 )
⇔ 1 =0 0224 and 2 =2
Thus, the individual cost function is the following one:










































X (g) S (m3) τ (€) K (€)C  ( €) Total cost TM (mg)
2,833 0 36.9 423,116 0 423,116 1,700
2,667 0 37.1 429,280 0 429,280 1,600
2,500 0 37.4 435,489 0 435,489 1,500
2,462 0 37.4 436,929 0 436,929 1,477
2,333 0 37.7 441,741 0 441,741 1,400
2,167 0 37.9 448,039 0 448,039 1,300
2,000 0 38.2 454,381 0 454,381 1,200
Without Wetland Restoration
Figure 5: Sensibility study without AW construction
22X (g) S (m3) τ (€) LS (€)K  ( €)C  ( €) Total cost TM (mg)
24,010 139.72 3 64,162 1,503 7,096 8,598 1,700
22,599 139.83 5 111,007 7,285 7,098 14,383 1,600
21,186 139.88 7 151,500 16,262 7,098 23,360 1,500
20,860 139.88 8 159,937 18,786 7,098 25,885 1,477
19,769 139.90 10 185,713 28,476 7,098 35,574 1,400
18,359 139.91 12 213,380 43,818 7,099 50,917 1,300
16,952 139.92 14 234,656 62,309 7,099 69,408 1,200
Optimum
Figure 6: Sensibility study with AW construction
23